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Article 3

Essay

A Catholic Law School
John T. Noonan, Jr.
What is a Catholic law school? An old conundrum. After all,
the law studies are the same whatever the denominational label of
the school: the opinions of the Supreme Court, the Uniform Commercial Code, the casebooks do not change their texts to fit a
Catholic context. The essential disciplines of question and argument, distinction-making and reasoning to a conclusion do not
depend upon any religion. Over a century and a half ago
Tocqueville observed that the lawyers of America naturally constitute a body "not by any previous understanding, or by an agreement that directs them to a common end; but the analogy of
their studies and the uniformity of their methods connect their
minds as a common interest might unite their endeavors."' The
lawyers of America are a body, or party, although not a political
one. Their minds are connected by the uniformity of their studies.
And their being a body and a party does not depend upon the institution where they studied. Having taught at Boston College,
Boston University, Southern Methodist, Stanford, Notre Dame,
Harvard, and Berkeley, I can say from experience that the legal
culture of the country is common to all these schools. The common character of legal institutions runs against any specific religious flavoring of the curriculum. The lawyers' party is not one of
believers and nonbelievers; it is the party of lawyers.
Nonetheless, there are at least three intellectual aspects of a
Catholic law school's origins and activity that make it different.
First, there is its connection with the history of the law. The mother of all law schools is Bologna, the splendid creation of the religious and cultural revival of the twelfth century. The Bolognese
method of collecting authorities, critically comparing them, and
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Ciicuit; A.B., 1947, Harvard;
Ph.d., 1951, Cath. Univ.; LL.B., 1954, Harvard; LL.D.
1 ALEXIs DE TocQuEvaLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERIcA 1, 273 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d
ed. 1838).
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challenging their conclusions was the preferred approach of that
nascent and vigorous Catholic culture. The first great legal casebook is Master Gratian's Harmony of Unharmonious Canons, a work
that proceeds by hypotheticals as boldly outrageous as any of Professor Rodes' and then arranges the authorities pro and con on
each question, creating space for Gratian to provide his own resolution of the matter.' Every law teacher learns this secret: respect
the authorities but leave room to give your own view of what the
result should be.
The same spirit was alive nearly 400 years later when Thomas
More answered a monk who had attacked More's friend Erasmus
by citing against him the undivided authority of the Fathers of the
Church. "Do you not know," More asked him, "that Jerome contradicts Augustine on these points and Augustine contradicts
Jerome, and Ambrose disagrees with Augustine, and all of them
denied the Immaculate Conception of Mary, which is now generally accepted? There will be no end," More exclaims, "if I try to set
out all the things in which these very learned and very holy men
erred."' As we look at Gratian's ancient casebook that remained
in use in the Church for about 800 years and as we look at
More's letter of 1520, we cannot but feel that the kinship that
unites us with Gratian and More has Catholic roots in a respect
for authority that is yet not above question and not above the
examination and the distinctions, in other words the challenges
and the reasoning of law school.
The method of Bologna is, of course, a common Anglo-American patrimony, whatever our special sense of Catholic linkage.
From a closer look at history one can also find linkage between
Anglo-American law and the work of Catholic priests. The common law in its beginnings consisted almost entirely in the decisions of judges, who were clerics, paid in part by the king, but
supported largely by benefices awarded to them as Catholic clergy.
Judge-made law in the thirteenth century was law made by churchmen-judges. The greatest of them was William Ralegh, the parish
priest of Sumborn and treasurer of Exeter Cathedral, who with his
beneficed law clerk, Henri de Bratton, produced that great original treatise on the common law, De legibus et consuetudinibus

2
3

GRATIAN, CONCORDIA DISCORDANTIUM CANONUM (Friedberg ed., 1879-1891).
Letter from Thomas More To a Monk, in THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THOMAS

MORE 165, 171 (Elizabeth Frances Rogers ed., 1947) [hereinafter More] (translated by
author).
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Angliae.4 Ralegh thought being bishop of Norwich preferable to
being Chief Justice of England. However, before he moved to the
episcopal bench, he left a permanent stamp on the common law
as a law built up by cases. He laid the foundations of this extraordinary enterprise that has continued from 1230 to the present. Like the masons of a great cathedral, each judge has contributed to the edifice; analogizing the common law to a cathedral is
not inappropriate because it demonstrates the religious devotion
with which each kind of enterprise began.
As for equity, everyone knows that ' equity was the creation of
the chancellor's conscience, and that virtually all of the chancellors before the Reformation were Catholic churchmen. The greatest chancellor, of course, was a layman, Thomas More. Like
Ralegh-Bratton's book and like equity itself, Thomas More is part
of the common Anglo-American patrimony. Every lawyer can appreciate More's stand for conscience-his refusal to take the king's
command as the measure of his duty. A Catholic law school, assuredly, can look in a most particular way to More as an exemplar
for its students and professors. Killed for the Church and Pope
and motivated by the love of Christ, More was a lawyer and a
saint.
Dealing with a subject whose methods were made and whose
foundations were laid by fellow believers, with the example of a
learned lawyer and judge who was also a martyr, a Catholic law
school must be conscious that Anglo-American law is not alien to
faith; such a school must indeed be aware of its roots in faith if it
is to be aware of its own vocation. If, as Holmes so accurately
observed, experience is the life of the law, these centuries of Catholic experience are to be cherished. It is a sign of Notre Dame
Law School's Catholic character that there should come from the
school such a distinguished historical enterprise as Robert Rodes'
legal account of the Church in England. Rodes' unmatched insight into legal experience that is also a reflection of theological
experience, his double mastery of legal reasoning and
ecclesiological theory, and his deep empathy for lawyers and for
churchmen are the marks of a scholar in a school appropriating
its heritage and turning it to present account.4 On Ralegh's authorship, see 3 DE LEGIBUS Er CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, III,
XXXVI (Samuel Thorne ed., 1977). On the proper spelling of Bratton, see id. at 79. On
Ralegh's positions, see CAF. Meekings, Introducdion to 15 CURIA REGIS RoLLs XXVIII
(1972).
5

See ROBERT E. RODES, JR., EccLEsIAsTIcAL ADMINISrRATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND:
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History is philosophy teaching by example, but philosophy in
its own right also has its place in any law school. In a Catholic law
school philosophy is, or should be, of unchallenged importance.
Jurisprudence, the philosophy of law, is an art that does not attract every law student, and its masters are not many. But that law
depends on ideas more extensive than law-ideas such as intention and causation, individual and corporate responsibility, guilt
and justice; that the legal concepts may be affected by such nonlegal concepts as repentance, forgiveness, and charity; and that the
most fundamental of legal concepts, that of the person, has metaphysical dimensions-all of these inputs of jurisprudence need
both integration in the curriculum and their own specific examination. Integration and examination have been the case in a Catholic law school like Notre Dame.
In particular, I want to commemorate the work of Dean Joseph O'Meara and his colleagues in fostering the Natural Law
Forum Both "natural" and "law" are, to be sure, terms with multiple meanings, and the number of possible meanings is increased
when the terms are combined. Natural law has never been restricted to an univocal meaning. But the basic idea-that there is a
measure beyond the command of the sovereign-is common to
natural law thinkers. Natural law, historically, had implications for
the use of power. It has been an idea capable of checking arbitrary civil power and arbitrary papal power. Natural law was the
rallying point for those nineteenth century Americans who opposed slavery, as it became a way of criticizing Nazi law and other
abominations in this century.
"Why are you Catholics so interested in natural law?" Circuit
Judge Calvert Magruder demanded of me when I was editor of
the Natural Law Forum. Oddly, what was meant to appeal to all
persons of good will has sometimes been seen in this way as a
Catholic monopoly or peculiarity. It is not, but it is true that Notre Dame Law School played a major part in making natural law
relevant to modem America.
In the initial issue of the Natural Law Forum in 1956, Dean
O'Meara eschewed what he called with characteristic bluntness
"the meat-cleaver approach to natural law," that is, "assuming the
rectitude of one's own position and concentrating on the decapita-

THE ANGLO SAXONS TO THE REFORMATION

(1977); LAY AUTHORTY AND

REFORMATION IN

THE ENGLISH COURTS: EDWARD I TO THE CIVIL WAR (1982); LAW AND MODERNIZATION IN
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: CHARLES II TO THE WELFARE STATE (1991).
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•tion of all who disagree."6 In contrast, he endorsed the view that
"'we must start from scratch and think every problem through
from its very premises to its last implications. We must never rest
with what7 we have achieved, we must never rest lazily on any given
"truth".'" In such a restless, inquisitive spirit the Natural Law Forum was launched. Its first editor was Spanish, its second, German;
and its editorial board included the leading jurisprudents of the
United States, among them Edward Levi, Myres DcDougal, and the
greatest, Lon Fuller. Ecumenical in the composition of its board
and in the variety of articles it published, the Natural Law Forum
was Catholic in its inspiration, concerns, and commitment to the
fusion of morality and law and the rule of reason in morality.
Joe O'Meara was interested in natural law because he believed
that "natural law can be made to serve practical ends in the legal
order."' An interest in natural law led easily to questions of ethics. Here again Joe O'Meara was a leader. He instituted a
course-a course that was mandatory for first year students-in
professional ethics. He was a decade or so ahead of most other
law schools. When I arrived at Notre Dame in the fall of 1961 I
had never had such a course nor seen one taught. With great
confidence in a lawyer's ability to pick up ideas quickly, Dean
O'Meara asked me to teach the course. One did not easily refuse
a request from Dean O'Meara. I took the plunge and was rewarded by finding a subject that in thirty years of teaching has not
exhausted its excitement for me. More importantly, it is fair to say
that Dean O'Meara's initiative and the ethos of the law school led
to the work of a national leader in the field of legal ethics, Thomas Shaffer. Who else could have addressed the difficult, delicate,
possibly dichotomous subject, "On Being A Christian and A Lawyer"?9 Where else could a law professor have come to the conclusion that law faculties must be specialists in morals and prophets
to boot.
To mention Shaffer's work is to come to a dimension beyond
the philosophical. He does not avoid the theological. He invokes
Scripture. He invokes the example of Jesus. He turns to prayer. I

6 Joseph O'Meara, Forward I NAT. LF. 1 (1956).
7 Id. (quoting Romano Guardini).
8 Id.
9 THoMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRIriAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOcENT (1981).
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do not see a secular law school encouraging such a fusion of the
responsibilities of the lawyer and the love of Christ.
It is no accident that Shaffer's work reflects collaboration with
a theological ethicist, Stanley Hauerwas. It is no accident that
Rodes has had a long association with Notre Dame's John Dunne.
To add a note of personal reminiscence, when I was a member of
the faculty the common luncheon table was one shared by law
school faculty and theological faculty. We were, we lawyers mischievously declared, keeping the theologians orthodox; and, it may be
supposed, they thought they were enlarging our horizons and
leading us from the letter to the spirit.
The relation of law and theology in Catholic experience has
always been symbiotic, the living together of two dissimilar organisms in a mutually beneficial relation. From law, theology took, for
example, its notion of what constituted the marriage that theology
then declared indestructible. From theology, law took, for example, its notion that marriage was a personal commitment not to be
thwarted by the state or coerced by the family. It is easy for the
symbiosis to continue in a law school physically part of a university
where theology is a vital discipline and with a law school faculty in
actual communication with the theologians next door. Interchange
of this kind is indispensable for a Catholic law school to flourish.
When there are also members of a religious order who are members of the law school faculty, as is the case at Notre Dame, and
when these persons are experienced lawyers and theologically
sophisticated, as is the case at Notre Dame, the interchange can
even be internal to the school.
The greatest debt of law to theology is the idea of the person-a concept that can be philosophically defended, but which
historically developed under theological auspices, with human
beings understood by analogy to the divine persons. 10 Only in
terms of a destiny that transcends death can the full measure of
human personhood be taken. Only as images of God can the full
dignity of human persons be acknowledged. Lawyers must deal
with the common good. It is the common good, not of animals,
but of persons whose spiritual characteristics make transcendent,
nonmaterial values part of the good that the law must preserve.
Hence, not only the preservation of order, but the preservation of
human dignity became part of that legal enterprise Bob Rodes has

10 Marcel Mauss, Une Categaire de L'Epiit Humain: La Notion de Personne, Celle de
"Moi", 68 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 263, 263-82 (1938).
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so penetratingly described. Sensitivity to that dignity must animate
the civil rights work of Father Bill Lewers. Those human creatures
whose destiny and therefore dignity transcend death include even
the smallest and youngest among us, as Edward Murphy and
Charles Rice have so vigorously maintained.
As I speak of the place of persons in the law, I cannot but
think of failures as well as triumphs. When Ralegh-Bratton composed their great treatise on law they recognized that persons
must be free, but went right on to accept the law that created
slavery." This failure of the jurists and the theologians was "to
infect the European and American worlds for six hundred years. A
failure of equal magnitude by both jurists and theologians was the
denial of religious freedom-a denial based on a failure to give
substance to their recognition that the conscience of a person
could not be coerced; the denial
was fully rectified only in 1965
12
Council.
Vatican
Second
the
by
A Catholic law school is a good place to recall these failures,
which were those of our predecessors. Are we similarly blind? In a
country where aliens have a precarious second-class citizenship,
where the governmental putting to death of major criminals is
popular, and where the incarceration of over one million persons
is the accomplishment of our legal system, we cannot be complacent or content.
Nor can we be complacent about the place of law in the
international world of which we are a part, of which we are specially a part as Catholics, tied by a common faith to believers
everywhere. In one year, 1988-89, throughout the world over 145
lawyers and judges were seriously harassed, over thirty-five percent
of these were murdered."i I wonder if there is any other profession, except perhaps that of missionaries, whose members are so
perceived as dangers to the powerful and so ruthlessly attacked.
The Center for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, located
in Geneva, gives the annual assessment. In the past decade from
Chile to China, from the Philippines to South Africa; the role of
lawyers and judges has been critical to the cause of liberty and

11 DE LEGIBUS ET cONsUETUDINIBUs ANGLIAE, supra note 4, at 2, 30 ("How Slaves Are
Made").
12

Second Vatican Council, DedaratioDe Libertate Religiosa, 58 ACrA APOSTAUCAE SEDIS

929 (1965).
13 Center For The Independence of Jurists, The Harassment and Persecution of Judges
and Lauyers, January 1988-June 1989, 22 CENTER INDEPENDENCE JUDGES LAW. BULL. 64

(1988).
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risky for the bench and bar. 14 A Catholic law school cannot be
indifferent to the perils of fellow practitioners of the profession
wherever they may practice.
The supranational dimension of modem law has been emphasized in a positive way by the creation of the European Court of
Human Rights. National infringements on human dignity can now
be indicted before that tribunal. The court has passed judgment
on the flogging of a schoolboy on the Isle of Man and on the
stifling of the freedom of the London Sunday Times by the House
of Lords."5 When even Britain's highest court can be made accountable and Britain itself made liable for damages for the violation of human rights, one knows that the Anglo-American experience of law has been enormously enlarged. A Catholic law school
cannot be insensitive to this new international forum in which the
dignity of the person receives recognition and protection. It is
characteristic of a Catholic law school such as Notre Dame that its
international reach is such that Professor Bauer directs second-year
and graduate programs in London, that Professor John Attanasio
is the director of the Institute for International Peace Studies, and
that Dean Link has extended leave to be the founding president
of a new Catholic university in Australia.
So far, I have dwelt on subjects for teaching, research, and
scholarly publication, and the recurrent theme has been the relation of law to persons, a relation that implicates religion, specifically the Catholic religion. But what of the persons who are to be
participants in this process? What of the students and faculty of a
Catholic law school? Must they be Catholics, too?
My answer is, not all, but enough to give substance to the
claim of the school to be a Catholic law school. I have known,
and you could no doubt name them, law schools attached to institutions that are Catholic, but which have at most one or two Catholics on the faculty. I have even known law schools whose nominal
heritage was Catholic, but a number of whose faculty were hostile
or contemptuous of Catholic values, schools whose whole tone was
less open to religion than avowedly secular institutions. I see no
point in pretending that it does not make a difference what religion the faculty professes.

14

See, e.g., Amnesty International, Philippines: The Killing and Intimidating of Human

Right Lauyers, 22 CENTER INDEPENDENCE JUDGES LAW. BULL. 40 (1988).
15

The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
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At the same time, one should be aware of how hateful and
divisive it would be if active membership in the Church were
made a condition for continuing employment, and the sanction of
loss of one's job was the way the Catholic identity of the school
was maintained. A Catholic law school that had trials for heresy
would be a laughing stock in our profession.
The real issue is recruitment. A law school wants the best
faculty it can find. Does a Catholic law school want only the best
Catholic faculty it can find? Experience suggests that it is necessary
to answer this question affirmatively, but not rigidly. The main attraction of a Catholic law school should be the historical, jurisprudential, and ethical dimensions I have indicated. There are Protestants and Jews and agnostics who would be attracted to such a
school. It would be a mistake to exclude them. It would equally
be a mistake to ignore the likelihood that only a body the core of
which is Catholic will have the concerns and commitments that
perpetuate the connection with theology, philosophy, and history
that constitute the school's Catholic character.
As for students, much the same is true, mutatis mutandis. A
Catholic law school should never exclude a student on account of
religion. A good Catholic law school will attract students who seek
a Catholic identity. A school that claims to be Catholic and obtains students on that basis, while knowing in fact no Catholic
character, practices a form of misrepresentation, which if probably
not actionable, is morally objectionable. Access to mass, observance of feast days, the availability of theological counsel, the
practice of public prayer, and the presence of Catholic action
groups are adjuncts that are far from superfluous in maintaining a
Catholic character.
So far, I have spoken as though an accredited American law
school could draw the lines that it liked. Such may not be the
case. The American Bar Association has declared in Standard 211
for accreditation: "The law school shall not use admission policies
that preclude a diverse student body in terms of race, color, religion, national origin or sex;" and employment of faculty shall be
without discrimination "on grounds of race, color, religion, national origin or sex."" This blunt equation of religious discrimination

16 AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (1990) (Standard 211); see also Leonard J. Nelson, III, RdigiousDisrimination, Christian Mission and Legal Education: The Implications of the Oral Roberts University Accreditation Controversy, 15 CUMB. L REv. 663 (1985).
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with race or gender discrimination is then qualified to permit "a
preference for persons adhering to the religious affiliations and
purposes of the law school," but only to the extent that such preferences "are protected by the United States Constitution." 17 The
Association of American Law Schools ("AALS"), the other relevant
agency, also outlaws by executive committee regulation any discrimination on the basis of religion, adding a proviso permitting
religious preferences so long as they do not result "in a lack of
sufficient intellectual diversity," do not limit the number of persons on religious grounds, and do not violate any other regulations of the AALS's executive committee."
How much freedom does a school have to remain accredited
and Catholic in the core of its faculty and students? None at all
under these rules. The AALS regulation, awkwardly drafted as it is,
appears to forbid a school from seeking to establish the hegemony
of any one religion on its faculty or in its student body. The regulation also arrogates to the executive committee the power to
decide that the vague criterion of intellectual diversity has not
been met. The ABA Standard 211 gives the Catholic school no
more leeway than the First Amendment.
If the 1990 decision of the Supreme Court in Employment
Division v. Smith remains the law, the religion portion of the First
Amendment is no help at all; for Smith holds a claim of free exercise of religion will not prevail against a general law, that is, a law
which does not purposefully discriminate against a religion.' 9 The
ABA general rule says religious discrimination is like race or gender discrimination; it is a bad practice. Under Smith I do not see
that a Catholic law school can contend that the general rule unconstitutionally invades its free exercise of religion.
What the ABA may do, however, is to threaten to violate the
Catholic law school's freedom of speech. The orgainzation may
impose upon a Catholic law school the sponsorship of ideas which
the school does not believe in. The organization has power as an
accrediting agency of the state to enforce, or threaten to enforce,
its standards so that a Catholic or Jewish or Mormon or Pentecostal law school must speak like a secular law school. Yet no one
supposes that Oral Roberts Law School is indifferent to whether a
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 16.
18 ASSOCIATION OF AMERCAN LAW SCHOOLS, ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 34 (1991) (Executive Committee Regulation 6.17; "Law Schools with a Religious Affiliation or Purpose").
19 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

17
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faculty member is an Orthodox Jew or an Evangelical Protestant.
No one supposes that it is an accident that Brigham Young Law
School has more Mormons than Catholics on its faculty. No one
believes that it is merely what the Free Exercise Clause permits
that has enabled Notre Dame Law School to be the preeminent
Catholic law school. It is a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation ... that no official, high or petty, can prescribe" what
we must profess.2" That freedom from censorship, from prescribed words or symbols of compliance with authority, is a freedom of our institutions as much as a freedom of individuals. It is
a freedom from state agents such as an accrediting agency. We
have lived with this kind of hostile, dogmatic, secularizing power;
so far we have been spared any effort on its part to enforce its demands.
In celebrating Notre Dame's sesquicentennial, I have emphasized some things that have made Notre Dame Law School special,
some things that have made it stand out, nationally and internationally, as a Catholic law school. I have not mentioned all the
excellences it shares with the best of secular schools, and yet, it
would be silly to slight the importance of these qualities. To have
a faculty with wide experience in government and in private practice, to have a remarkably sensitive admissions process and a student body drawn from a broad range of colleges, to have an outstanding library and librarians, to have a low ratio of students to
faculty, to run the National Institute for Trial Advocacy, the Institute for Urban Studies, the Center for Civil and Human Rights,
the White Center on Law and Government, the Notre Dame Law
Review, the Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, the Journal of
Legislation, and the Journal of College and University Law-all of
these activities that are so well done at Notre Dame, although they
could be well done elsewhere, are essential to the school being a
good school.
I have in mind the words of our exemplar Thomas More in
the same letter of 1520 .1 have already quoted. He is commenting
on the preference each one has for what is private to that person,
in foolish disregard of what is shared with all. So the monk prefers his own prayers and devotions to those of the monastery's, of
the monastery's to the order's, of his order to those that are common to all Christians. Yet, what is more important are the faith,

20 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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hope, and charity that are common to all. 21 So too, though we

may prize the special attributes of the Catholic law school, the
qualities common to all excellent schools must be its first and
amplest boast.

21

More, supra note 3, at 196.

